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SOME ASPECTS OF DEFENCE IN THE EIGHTEEN FIFTIES IN 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
By DUNCAN MACCALLUM 
THIS paper is confined to some of the political aspects of Colonial and Imperial 
defence, and does not discuss technical strategy; nor are even the political 
aspects of naval defence discussed. The paper suggests that the activity of Sir 
William Denison in New South Wales, coming after the attempts by Earl Grey to 
reduce Imperial military expenditure, and the activity of John Robert Godley in 
the War Office, and of his friends, were important factors in the ending of the British 
garrison system in colonies which had achieved some measure of responsible 
government. 
The views of all three men took account of the growth of the Australian colonies, 
and those of Grey and Godley were part of separate strands of thought which formed 
a pattern of opinion in favour of reducing British military expenditure. Trends and 
events elsewhere in the Empire were observed and influenced opinion. In fact, 
New South Wales and Victoria were less obviously open to criticisms of their military 
contribution than were the more complicated societies of South Africa and New 
Zealand. 
The eighteen fifties and eighteen sixties in the Australasian group generally 
saw the occasional war scares, such as the Crimean War, the fear of the French, 
and the American scares of 1859 and 1861, the Polish scare of 1864. The colonies, 
aware of their growing pastoral wealth and gold, developed some transitory interest 
in building fortification and in having available some military forces with which to 
man them. More significantly the period also saw the culmination of the attempts 
to relieve British military pressure and to lessen the dispersion of garrisons abroad. 
It was a period in which, in Eastern Australia, New South Wales and Tasmania 
acquired a large measure of control over their internal affairs and in which Queensland 
and Victoria were created with large measure of self-government. They were pre-
occupied with its exercise even sometimes when the military aspect of the external 
world seemed threatening. There was a tendency to accept greater responsibility 
for defence, but against a background of continual Imperial strength. The long-run 
estimate may be that the sum total of achievement was small in the colonies, but 
this should not obscure the importance of the changes in the weight of participation 
in defence activities which occurred in these years as between the colonies and the 
mother country. 
By the beginning of the eighteen sixties, the military preparedness of the 
Australian colonial group was still affected by British colonial military policy. Though 
a large measure of responsible government had been attained in New South Wales, 
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Queensland, Victoria and South Australia, decisions as to peace and war were made 
by the Imperial Government, which also formulated and conducted British foreign 
policy. The control of the Queen's troops, including decisions as to their movement, 
also remained in Imperial hands. Even before the constitutional trends matured, 
however, local legislatures were expected to contribute some at least of the money 
for fortification and even sometimes some for troops. Given the importance of the 
Imperial Government's control, it would be incorrect to consider Australian military 
arrangements without some reference to the wider context of British military colonial 
policy generally. 
SOME BRITISH OPINION IN REGARD TO IMPERIAL GARRISONS IN THE 
COLONIES 
The direction of later Utilitarian, and also Radical, thought, of the influence 
of the Manchester School, and of the Colonial Reformers, was conducive to the cutting 
down of Imperial expenditure on colonies; and military expenditure was an important 
part of this, especially in the case of colonies that made provision for much of their 
civil expenditure. There were wide differences among those who argued for economy 
in colonial military expenditure; the Sydney ltforning Herald, for instance, not 
ineptly summed up! one such difference between the reformers led by Molesworth 
and those led by Cobden when it said that one recognized the colonists as part of the 
British family and the other as mere rivals in the art of money-making. Colonial 
reformers, such as Adderley (later the first Viscount Norton)2 and John Robert Godley, 
looked back nostalgically at the military self-reliance of the old American colonies; 
they probably saw the self-reliance out of relationship to the challenge or threat,3 
and some saw the costly assumption of greater Imperial charges in Colonial defence 
as one of the ultimate factors in the discontent and changes leading to the Revolution 
of 1776. Both those, whom we would perhaps describe loosely as Imperialists and 
anti-Imperialists, were a significant force in Britain making for the reduction in 
Imperial military expenditure. The concomitant of such developments as repre-
sentative government-and even more so of responsible government-the repeal of 
the Navigation Laws, and the disappearance of exclusive markets or markets whose 
exclusiveness had been protected by Imperial legislation and arrangements, was 
seen to be some responsibility for self-defence-and not always just as a quid pro quo. 
If some relationships onerous to colonies disappeared, the arguments became stronger 
for economies to be derived from lessening Imperial responsibilities. 4 But it was 
sometimes seen, as colonial nationalism developed, that a moral corollary of political 
self-government was a capacity and will on the part of the colonial community to 
defend itself. 5 
If official opinion was more significant than public opinion, perhaps public 
opinion was less anti-Imperialist in the sense of favouring dismemberment than has 
been thought. 6 Some may not have always wanted to be pressed too sharply on the 
implications of their attitude or may not have always realized them fully, and 
Gladstone was cautious 7 as to the possibilities of persuading public opinion to reduce 
DEFENCE IN THE EIGHTEEN FIFTIES IN N.S.W. 13 
expenditure and to support firm official policy. Bodelsen has suggested8 that the 
public were fairly indifferent. At any rate, by the middle eighteen fifties there was 
certainly strong senior official opinion in favour of reducing expenditure, though there 
was much searching after the content of the Imperial relationship. 9 Given responsible 
government, given Imperial control of foreign policy, what was the tie between colony 
and mother country? Was it that the" new" community was protected by the 
old? If there was some content in the Imperial relationship other than that of 
military protection and obedience, did the obligation of protecting outweigh the 
advantages and benefits to the mother country, and would the relationship be 
appreciated by the colony if it was not given military protection? 
Some of the dissatisfaction with the colonial military policy in the fifties arose 
from the impression that the arrangements were expensive without being efficient. 
Iu the House of Commons, Adderley said10 of the present arrangements that not only 
were they needlessly expensive, but that not one single colony of the British Empire 
was in a state of adequate defence and security in the event of war breaking out. 
Both the majority and minority reports of the Committee on the Expense of the 
Military Defences of the Coloniesll agreed in this. Elliot, Assistant Under-Secretary 
for Colonies, expressed his agreement with Godley, then Assistant Under-Secretary 
in the War Department, and Hamilton (of the Treasury) that no success but rather 
disaster would be likely to emerge from " scattering the land forces of the Empire 
over the numerous outlying possessions of a great maritime and colonizing state" 
such as Great Britain. "The mistress of the seas is mistress of whatever colonies 
she pleases to hold or to take; and if she ceases to be mistress of the seas, it is not 
forts or garrisons which will save her colonies." Mr. Arthur Mills, the Chairman 
of the Select Committee of 1861, interpreted12 the evidence of General Burgoyne, 
who was the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and Rear-Admiral Erskine and 
Admiral Elliott as being that, notwithstanding the great cost of defence, a large number 
of the colonies were not defensible. Some of these fortifications might have been 
wrongly designed, as for instance, was considered the case in the controversy over 
the fortifications of Sydney Harbour. But the wider question was whether the 
arrangements were such as to be useful in the contingencies and situations for which 
they were designed. It was argued that the fortifications were frequently built where 
they could not be sufficiently garrisoned in the absence of local militia or volunteer 
forces, and it was argued that these fortifications in time of war might be turned by 
the enemy. The general trend of thought was that the vital matter was English 
supremacy at sea,13 even if in fact the Navy endured retrenchments. Lord Grey 
totally disapproved14 of the whole policy of large expenditure upon fortifications in 
colonies; the experiences of the past seemed to him to suggest "that almost the 
whole of the money had been absolutely wasted; that with respect to some of those 
fortifications erected at great expense, the wisest thing we could now do would be to 
blow them up again ". Gladstone's view was that the system, if it could so be called, 
as Merivale questioned, that was in existence was " founded upon a state of things 
in the condition of this Empire relatively to other powers which has entirely passed 
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away". He suggested that the modern quickness and constancy of communication 
meant that England was the very centre of those communications, and they could 
be supported upon the principle of keeping the great mass of force at home, 
and applying it as they may require.l 5 "If France in a war with England struck at 
the heart of the Empire, England ", said Robert Lowe,16 " I should hope the govern-
ment today would be inclined to keep every man in England and even bring troops 
from the colonies. We should think we could afford to lose a place like Sydney, but 
London we could not afford to lose from the Imperial point of view." The Duke 
of Newcastle argued17 that a consequence of the electrical telegraph would be that an 
enemy's fleet would take care to avoid those colonies in which they knew that England 
had a sufficient garrison and attack the weaker ones. Accordingly, referring to the 
Australian colonies, he thought1 8 it would be preferable to defend them with a Navy 
by intercepting the foreign attack from Europe. He would concentrate the land 
forces then as far as was possible (but it was "a matter of degree "). Godley, 
defending his plan of throwing the responsibility of defending themselves upon the 
colonists, argued that they would be less effectively defended by English garrisons, 
" which are uniformly inadequate", and which, in addition, rendered the colonists 
unprepared to defend themselves.l 9 The present arrangement would increase the 
number of British troops dispersed throughout the world in distant places, and this 
would weaken Britain in a future war.20 In effect, England would have a large portion 
of her forces locked up in distant parts of the world, and her own resources for any 
general war proportionately diminished. When he was examined in 1861, Godley's 
hostility to dispersion was tempered by his deference to the general principle of 
" letting the colonists settle for themselves what is the best way of defending them-
selves ".21 His main aim was to throw upon the colonists the habit of responsibility 
of self-defence, and it was a secondary but very important object to diminish the 
Imperial expenditure. 22 
The concern of the Select Committee was perhaps more with the cost to the 
United Kingdom of the existing arrangements than with their technical efficiency. 
The Committee did regard as important the effects on the colonists of not having the 
responsibility of their own defence. This question of responsibility was emphasized 
not only by Godley, but, of course, by Gladstone, and by others such as Adderley, 
who were constantly referring to the virtues in this respect of the Old Colonial System 
in its earlier phases. On the other hand, this concern over the expense of extensive 
colonial fortifications was the stronger because of the military misgivings as to their 
efficiency and because of a tendency to concentrate in the time of Anglo-French 
and Anglo-Russian tension on the defence of the Empire's heart. Even if there was 
a failure to work out the detailed implications of a reliance on naval strength for 
naval policy and the extra cost and burden which Empire imposed on Admiralty, 
the presence of a powerful Navy was assumed. 
There were, like Grey, Newcastle and Fortescue,23 some who were very careful 
about reducing the Imperial commitments irresponsibly.24 But the pressure of the 
Radicals was strong, and Secretaries of State and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries 
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were unwilling to give them levers which they could use to press them more drastically. 
Without drawing over-explicitly their attitudes, statesmen of different political beliefs 
and with different views as to the maintenance of Empire believed in a need to reduce 
military expenditure on the colonies, though there were differences as to the extent 
to which this was to be done and at what cost it was to be put into effect. 
There was, however, in the late eighteen fifties, fairly complete agreement that 
British colonies were entitled to some military assistance from the mother country 
because of the danger to them which could arise from their involvement in British 
foreign policy over which they had no control. 25 On the other hand it was sometimes 
felt that, especially in the case of Canada, Britain might be involved because of the 
involvement of her colonial sUbjects.26 There was also very general agreement in 
principle that the Imperial troops should not bear the responsibility for internal 
defence in countries governed under a system of responsible government. Some of 
this feeling came from an anachronistic fear on the part of Colonial Reformers, who 
feared the suppression of local political ambitions, the coercion of local opinion, by 
Imperial troops, but sometimes it derived from the opinion that the maintenance of 
law and order and the conduct of political policy were functions which should 
accompany one another.27 
There was, of course, some qualification and subtlety in the enunciation of this 
principle as to internal defence in the case of internal problems arising out of or 
accentuated by British policy~as in the West Indies. It was argued whether the 
natives were to be regarded as subjects of the Queen or as foreigners, and whether the 
conflict between settler and native was a local matter or a matter of Imperial concern.28 
One should not take too seriously Lord Herbert's remark29 when, as Secretary 
of State for War, he was asked about the use of Imperial troops in the putting down 
of riots. "All service is good for British troops; they do it all exceedingly well 
and it makes a variety for them." Herbert did agree that it would be very objection-
able if British troops were used for political purposes in a colony, although he was 
not convinced that it was easy to draw a distinction. Lord Grey's proposals of 1847 
and 1851 were much assisted in New South Wales by the spectre of the reception of 
convicts, and then by the gold discoveries. 
THE TREND OF POLICY TO REDUCE BRITISH MILITARY EXPENDITURE 
ON THE COLONIAL EMPIRE 
Indeed, probably one of the earliest incidents in the trend, in its more visible 
phases, to reduce British military colonial expenditure was the action by Lord Grey, 
as Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, in ordering the reduction of the 
garrison in New South Wales and a transfer of fortifications to the care of the colonial 
Government. Grey regarded his despatch of November, 1846,30 to Sir Charles 
FitzRoy, then Governor of New South Wales, as " the first step to carrying into effect 
the principle that the colonies, excepting important military and naval stations, 
can only look to the mother country for military support in any danger to which 
they may be exposed from a powerful foreign enemy; that lIer :'Ilajesty's troops are 
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not to be expected to undertake the duties of police and of maintaining the internal 
tranquillity of the colony .... "31 There was no particular local provocation for 
Grey's despatch to FitzRoy. 
The need to increase the home forces arising out of tension between England 
and France was conducive to a reduction in the colonial forces, as the Duke of 
Wellington's long-held concern over the smallness of the home army was confronted 
by the determination of the Treasury to reduce total military expenditure at a time 
when the government was no less than usually sensitive to radical opinion in 
Parliament.32 The need to transfer forces to New Zealand from New South Wales 
was the occasion on which Grey raised this matter in regard to New South Wales. 
Grey did not negotiate.3s He was perhaps more fortunate than some of his 
successors, in that he did not have to deal with a responsible ministry with independent 
revenue. Grey argued that the Australian colonies, and we may here confine our 
discussion to New South Wales, were entitled still to look for their fair share of that 
protection which it is the" object of Her Majesty's Naval and Military Forces to 
extend to all parts of the British Empire". 34 But the British Government thought 
that with such an increase in wealth and popUlation, the colonies could reasonably 
be expected to bear part of the heavy charges borne by the inhabitants of the United 
Kingdom. 
Grey's scheme was that the colonists would provide any additional means of 
local defence which might be required, and fortifications and local militia; in addition, 
any Imperial troops above the amount fixed by the Imperial Government were to 
be paid for by the colonial Government, assuming the Imperial Government had them 
available to supply on colonial request. They were to make provision for more police 
or other types of local force. In practice, at this stage, it was a matter of paying for 
more Imperial troops, the minimum number of which was to be determined and 
paid for by the Home Government. There is, perhaps, a tendency to identify local 
interests in defence and internal defence sometimes, though later the view was 
probably more widely held that the Queen's troops, whether paid for by the colony 
or not, should not assist in maintaining internal order. 
One reason for some opposition in the colony to Grey's proposals was that the 
colony was not so certain of its immunity from foreign attack, in particular at this 
time it feared there would be local repercussions if England and France were to come 
into collision over TahitP5 This divergence in views well illustrates the general 
problem. The British Government not unnaturally regarded36 the Australian 
community as peculiarly isolated from foreign attack, and no doubt its particular 
estimates were better founded than those of colonial public opinion. Colonial 
opinion thus insulated, relying on British naval protection, interested in the growth 
of the colonial society and economy, had not that constant preoccupation with 
measures for the integrity of the realm which had grown with the Imperial experience 
of Great Britain. When the colony became aware of threats, its interest was intense, 
if spasmodic and short-lived. The period was one in which there was occasion for 
anxiety in the Australasian group, particularly in regard to the French in Tahiti and 
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New Caledonia. In fact, during the Crimean War there was probably more anxiety 
among the Imperial proconsuls in regard to possible attacks by " our friends the 
French" from New Caledonia and" our relations the Americans" than in regard 
to visits by the Russians.37 
The despatches of the Governor, Sir Charles FitzRoy, and the debates of the New 
South Wales Legislative Council show38 concern that enough forces be present to 
provide against internal disorder; though the Legislature's debates reveal mixed 
feelings and a fear lest the colony might be saddled with the whole military 
expenditure. The Governor was aware of the charged atmosphere over the land 
question, and both Governor and Council were aware of possible uses for troops in a 
colony which had been penal. 
Of course, the relevance of convictism could be seen differently from the Imperial 
point of view. A motion in the New South Wales Legislative Council in 1850, 
protesting against the withdrawal of troops because of its inopportuneness" from the 
aspect of internal police and crime", evoked a reply from Earl Grey that if the police 
were needed because of the former presence of a penal establishment, the wealth 
of the colony was largely due to the presence of convict labour.39 
Though not surprisingly, Dr. John Dunmore Lang discounted40 the need for 
troops, FitzRoy-now Governor-General in and over New South Wales and the other 
colonies-wanted an increased military force as a result of the influx of population 
and the expected problems of law and order in the gold colony, and the extra troops 
were made available at the colonial cost. 41 
By the middle of the eighteen fifties, circumstances had changed and the need 
arose for manning fortifications, whose building had been delayed by colonial 
sensitivity over the delay in securing responsible government. By this time, 
however, Sir William Denison was Governor-General and the Crimean War stimulated 
local interest in defence, if it also was the occasion for review and change in the military 
administration in Great Britain. 
If the Colonial Reformers argued that representative and responsible 
government had as a corollary greater colonial responsibility for self-defence, 
somewhat the same connexion was made in New South Wales. For instance, it is 
significant, even if it was a matter of bargaining rather than of conviction, that the 
New South Wales Legislative Council in August, 1849, adopted Mr. Lowe's argument42 
that the management of wastelands should be transferred to the colony, in return 
for which the colony would pay for such military forces as the colonial Assembly 
to be established decided was necessary for its protection. The Herald was critical43 
of this, but considered the colony should not forget its own duties as well as its 
rights. 
The policy of reducing Imperial military commitments was, as the reason for it 
would suggest, a general Imperial policy not confined to the Australian group. An 
attempt had been made to apply it in British North America and at the Cape. In 
New Zealand, attempts had been made to secure greater local contributions, another 
form of colonial responsibility. 44 
B 
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Soon after the Whigs came to power, Grey took advantage of the Oregon 
Settlement to reduce the numbers in British North America. He indicated in 1847 
and 1848 that the British Government could not assume responsibility for the salary 
of the Governor-General of Canada until it secured relief by the partial assumption 
by the colony of its defence costs. The Governor-General, Elgin, agreed with Grey, 
but was aware of the encouragement which the proximity of America could give to 
separatist feeling if the Secretary proceeded with anything but great caution, and he 
convinced Grey of the distinction between what "ought, in reason, to be the 
arrangement and what can be so". 45 
It was not only a matter of encouraging the faithful among the colonists, and 
avoiding encouragement to separatists. The other major factor was the relations 
with the United States of America. 
But the transfer of ordnance lands and barracks was made, and if the tempo of 
reduction varied to such an extent that it was not always even reduction, there is no 
doubt about the intention of the policy. "The policy of Her Majesty's Government", 
wrote46 Labouchere in 1855, " continues the same, and they desire to place their main 
dependence on the well-proved loyalty and courage of Her Majesty's Canadian 
subjects." Elgin, back in the House of Lords, in 1856 was concerned lest the act of 
increasing the garrison. connected with the British-United States differences over 
recruiting and the Clayton Bulwer Treaty of 1850, should be regarded as suggesting 
that the earlier reductions were accidental. They had been the " result of a policy 
deliberately adopted and steadily and consistently carried out", and would have 
taken effect even if the Crimean War had not occurredY 
The Maritime Provinces did not seem so wealthy or so capable of self-reliance as 
Canada, and the great harbour of Halifax was regarded as " one of the mostimportant 
positions in a strategical point of view in North America". 48 So the same pressure 
was not put upon them, and it was the unevenness of the arrangement that led 
Godley to refer to the inconsistency and inequality of arrangements in North America, 
the only area apart from Australia in which he thought the Grey arrangements had 
been applied. 49 The number of troops stationed in Canada did not exceed the 
minimum paid for by the Imperial Government. 50 
The demands for the Crimean expeditionary forces accelerated the trend. From 
1857, when relations with the United States improved, the economy path was 
retrodden and further explored, for with the Indian Mutiny there was another 
reduction. 51 In New Zealand, too, an arrangement was initiated for the colony to 
contribute £5 per soldier, though this, too, was prejudiced by the breaking out of the 
Maori Wars, which had quadrupled the number of troops in New Zealand. The 
total cost to Britain apparently exceeded 52 £80 per soldier, not including transport, 
so New Zealand was not to contribute a very large proportion. 
At the Cape there had been constant effort on the part of the Colonial Office 
to diminish the number of troops, and" they have been as constantly increased 
again, upon some apprehension arising". 53 There had been attempts" in the most 
eloquent manner and constantly repeated to call upon the Colony to contribute to 
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its own defences". 54 The number of troops between 1857 and 1861 was reduced by 
half. 55 The German Legion had been recruited, and even after this the cost in 1861 
was about £500,000, and the Duke of Newcastle considered 56 that between £500,000 
and £750,000 a year was the average cost in the 'fifties of South African military 
defence, with or without native wars. Though Newcastle pointed out that the Cape 
was the bastion on the route to India and the place for keeping Imperial reserves, 
the Duke agreed that it was relations with the natives which substantially caused 
the number of troops there to vary. 57 By the end of the eighteen fifties the expense was 
diminishing and might be looked upon as " in the course of progressive reduction" . 58 
Merivale, who early in 1861 had left the Permanent Under-Secretaryship for the 
Colonies to take the corresponding post in the India Office, agreed rather with the 
variation, in reference to New Zealand and the Cape, of Mr. Arthur Mills, " oscillating 
expenditure sometimes more, sometimes less, depending upon the breaking out of a 
native war". 59 
SIR WILLIAM DENISON-THE DEFENCES IN NEW SOUTH \VALES-THE POSITION 
WHEN HE ARRIVED AND DURING HIS ADMINISTRATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
By this time, Sir William Denison had been for some years in New South Wales; 
in fact, his term was just ending. By profession an engineer, in 1842 he had won 
respect, and indeed his knighthood, for his inspection of the Bermuda defences. 
During his term as Lieutenant-Governor of Van Diemen's Land, he maintained his 
interest in defence matters, both inside and outside the Colony. 60 
Denison's previous interests and his occupancy of the Governor-Generalship 
at this particular time are by themselves sufficient to account for his giving much 
thought to defence matters. Temperamentally he was an active and energetic man, 
anxious to participate in affairs. Though the role of the representative of the Crown 
in decision-making declined after the attainment of responsible government, it is 
unlikely that Denison welcomed a more passive role. Even if he thought the 
Governor-Generalship an idle office which should be discontinued61 (Denison continued 
to be Governor-General), he was interested in questions affecting the various colonies 
such as steam postal communication. This, after all, was the man who wrote to an 
acquaintance in February, 1857: "I am President of a Philosophical Society and I 
have succeeded in organizing an Agricultural Society. For both of these I have to 
write. This gives me something to do."62 His long comments and appreciations 
on military matters may have given satisfaction to himself as well as interest to his 
readers. 
But in New South Wales, Denison encountered several matters which engaged 
and perhaps deepened his interest. The first he noticed even on his way to Govern-
ment House: "the conviction of the inefficiency of the works now in progress forced 
itself on me as I was entering the harbour. I lost no time in making myself acquainted 
with all that had taken place both with relation to these works and the defences 
in general." 63 
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It sounds almost like one of the stories about General von lVloltke. It seems 
perhaps strange that anyone entering the harbour as it must have looked on a fine 
January day in I8SS64 would have had time or inclination to dwell on this. It may 
have been an almost spontaneous piece of professional observation. The forti-
fications were obviously incomplete. The forts whose long-drawn-out conception 
had been quickened by the Crimean War were some of them still unfinished, though 
the rowing-boat which had been doing service at Sydney Heads had been replaced. 
When Denison came he found what came to be called the Grey Plan in operation-
in the sense of being the guiding principle-in New South Wales. Grey had suggested 
in I8S065 that, if the colonial Government desired to build fortifications by military 
labour, the British Government, without charging for pensions or for transport, 
would station an additional regiment of sappers and miners in the colony provided 
the colonial legislature voted their full pay. 
Grey's proposal was considered fairly favourably by the Executive Council,66 
and was recommended by the Government to the Legislative Council in November, 
I8SI,67 but the matter had been held up on the issue of the local Legislature's desire 
to control colonial territorial as well as colonial general revenue,68 and fortifications, 
too, were not given much attention until I8S3. In August, I8SI, meanwhile, as we 
noticed, FitzRoy had appealed for an increased military force on the grounds that 
more were needed to assist civil power to keep law and order in the new circumstances. 
Pakington, the Secretary of State for \Var and Colonies,69 agreed to send two service 
companies to New South Wales, the whole expense and upkeep to be defrayed by 
the colony. 
The British Government hoped that the Legislature would see the "justice 
and policy ... in consequence of the high cost of living which has become the conse-
quence of the recent discoveries of Gold" of making extra allowances to the officers. 
If the obligations were not met, the troops would be withdrawn. The Legislative 
Council had, in fact, at the beginning of October, I8S2, agreed70 in principle to make 
provision for the pay and subsistence of the troops within the colony. The subsequent 
military estimates were for the most part passed. The fears of external aggression, 
which were occasionally expressed in the colony at that time, perhaps to some extent 
influenced the acceptance of Grey's scheme and the colonial expenditure it implied. 
For instance, the possible arrival of filibusters from California was mentioned by 
Dr. Douglass 71 in the Legislative Council in I8S3 when urging the appointment of 
a Select Committee to inquire into the means of defending and putting Sydney Harbour 
into a proper state of defence, and the Governor-General assured the Legislative 
Council, when proroguing it late in December, I8S3, that he had adopted measures 
for beginning temporary works of defence. 72 He had asked the Colonial Office for 
a company of sappers and miners, but such was the demand for troops that it was, 
in fact, impossible to send out sappers or miners or artillery at that time. 73 
Perhaps inspired by some such agitation as to the Government's inactivity, 
the Colonial Secretary had obtained at the end of May, I8S4, a report on the progress 
made in the Harbour's defence works, and on the basis of this report the Governor-
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General found himself able to inform the Legislative Council early in June74 that the 
defence works were in a satisfactory state of progress. He had every confidence that 
with aid from a naval force in Sydney Harbour the colony had ample means of repelling 
a privateer's attack, and the vigilance of a French and English naval force in the 
Indian and Pacific Stations would be an adequate security that any attack more 
serious that that of a privateer would be easily frustrated. Almost at the end of the 
month the message announcing the declaration of war on Russia by England arrived. 75 
In spite of the apparently pressing need and the public agitation, in spite of 
suggestions to meet the emergency by removing the Treasury even twenty miles into 
the interior,76 the debate over the fortificc..dons vote did not occur for some time. 
Dr. Lang believed it was the bounden duty of Britain to protect the colonies while 
she exercised sovereignty, but his opinion that if the colonies separated tomorrow 
no foreign power would think of interfering with them did not receive much support. 77 
By November, 1854, however, the defence works were rapidly progressing, but it 
became known soon after Denison's arrival that the Governor-General had ordered 
part of the work to be stopped. 78 Denison thought that the works which had been 
agreed on were technically adequate, but for reasons of cost and the difficulty of 
manning them efficiently, he directed that a fresh scheme be prepared. 
THE LOCAL MATTERS INFLUENCING THE FORMULATION OF DENISON'S VIEWS ON AN 
ApPORTIONMENT OF DEFENCE RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN THE COLONIES AND THE 
MOTHER COUNTRY 
The controversy which developed over the relative desirability of the two schemes 
of fortification was of some importance, as in the short-run it delayed the adequate 
protection of Sydney Harbour and also involved Denison in the defence question 
locally. One scheme-that which Denison found half completed when he arrived-
put the main emphasis on works at the harbour's mouth; the most important 
advantage of his plan seemed to him to be that the batteries near the port could be 
more easily and more economically manned. 
Late in February, 1855,79 the Executive Council had considered Denison's views, 
and in view of the inability" under the altered circumstances of the colony to keep the 
several works at the entrance of the Port efficiently garrisoned, and the facility of 
garrisoning works in the City" deferred to Denison's opinion and advised the 
suspension of the works at the entrance. They anticipated" the concurrence of the 
Legislative Council", but considered that the other works of defence should be 
proceeded with immediately, the erection of entirely new batteries to wait" until 
an opportunity shall have been afforded of taking the views of the Legislative 
Council ". 
Several times the alterations were questioned by the Legislative Council, and 
the matter was not finally resolved until the end of August, 1855. Although there 
was some concern over possible foreign aggression, there was a great deal of apathy 
and some indifference. 
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NIr. (later Sir) Stuart Donaldson, for instance. felt 80 that it was preposterous that 
an enemy might really levy contributions to the tune of £5,000,000. If they came 
with that intention they would have to return very disappointed, for nothing would 
be easier than to remove the gold bullion in the banks to Parramatta by the railway. 
The Herald 81 was moved to write that the people of New South Wales were a pattern 
of philosophical indifference, and the Government on several occasions found its 
estimates were not passed. 82 Some of the opposition was regarded as a matter of 
party-political motives, suggesting, perhaps, that this topic seemed of secondary 
importance. 83 The Herald had taken 84 the point of view that the constitutional 
question of Denison's departure from the Council's enactment for the original forti-
fications was secondary to which was the better plan of defence. Some of the 
hesitation was undoubtedly due to this sensitivity over Denison's initiative, although 
a censure motion was defeated. The suspension of the works had perhaps caused all 
the more controversy because they had been reluctantly undertaken as a new duty 
and as an obligation to face a problem with which it had been previously the responsi-
bility of the Imperial Government to deal. 
Towards the end of r856, Denison, knowing the work was progressing, desired 
that the works be manned without delay, and was" the more anxious with regard 
to this as the prospect of war with America does not appear to be so remote as I 
would wish ".85 Reasons of economy and difficulty of recruitment had prevented 
the police from being used to the extent earlier hoped, and so Denison came to feel 
that a permanent military force was absolutely essential. 
The response to the external threat, the example of the Volunteer Movement 
in England and the feeling of self-reliance inspired the formation of the Volunteer 
Corps in New South Wales in r854. With the absence of a military tradition in the 
colony and the lessening of the external danger, the Movement lapsed until r860. 
In this year, again following the revival of threat in Europe and example in England, 
the second Volunteer Movement began, with its legislative sanction contained until 
r867 in the r854 Act of the New South Wales Legislative Council. Denison was very 
aware of the limited role the Volunteer organization could play, though he exerted 
himself in reviving the Corps. Since the Volunteer Corps did not significantly 
contribute to a solution, its treatment has been reserved for another paper. 
Not regarding volunteer corps or militia as the chief force, Denison managed 
to secure the agreement of his Executive Council to the presence of several artillary 
companies and an infantry regiment. He thought these were immediately necessary. 
As well as the size of the force, he thought that the expense and the distribution 
of costs between the Colony and the mother country had to be decided. 86 The 
total number of troops would be about 600, but the increase was within the maximum 
number for which the Imperial Government would provide ordinary pay and 
allowances, and the colonial Government would have to pay only the extra allowances. 
The Assembly, with some fear of foreign attack, by a small majority agreed to the 
allowances, but did not deal with the wider question. 87 By July, r859,88 Denison 
again consulted the Executive Council as to whether the Colony wished to retain some 
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additional companies which it was already planned to send away, which they could 
do by incurring some expense. The Executive Council preferred not to act without 
parliamentary authority. These attitudes may well have led Denison to think it 
dangerous to leave decisions as to the number of troops to a colonial Parliament. 
The discussions over the number of imperial troops and over the colonial 
allowances in r857 and r85889 in the Legislature are interesting as illustrating some 
colonial views as to the responsibility for colonial defence, the lack of sustained colonial 
interest and the extent to which the absence of local control sometimes prejudiced 
local support. 
It is difficult to separate out and characterize particular colonial attitudes, for 
the subject may not have ranked very importantly in the minds of colonial parlia-
mentarians. There was in r856 Mr. Arnold, speaking90 with less than justice, as 
the Herald pointed out,91 who said in the Legislative Assembly that the real use of 
the military and naval officers" appeared to be to give a brilliancy to public fetes, 
and to midnight balls". There was the republicanism of Dr. Lang which was not 
shared by the respectable inhabitants. References to republicanism, one suspects, 
sometimes were not to a republican form of government, but rather to the popular 
party which did not necessarily espouse separatism. 92 Perhaps "anti-British" 
social sentiment was underrated and, on the other hand, is confused with separatist 
sentiment. Perhaps both are given attention at the expense of a preoccupation 
with internal problems of growth in its various forms and a remote insularity in 
regard to overseas matters not confined to the radicals. This insularity was probably 
fundamentally the hope of being free from troublesome contact with European events 
and their consequences, even if it sometimes showed itself among respectable 
inhabitants in reference to the British connexion-which seemed the channel of 
contact. There seems also to have been some awareness, naturally without complete 
foresight of the eventual results, that colonial relationships were likely to change. 
The Herald agreed repeatedly that New South Wales should not cut the painter and 
that if she wished for British help she should make some contribution. There 
were some factors in common with other colonial societies, though there were 
important differences. 
Though the Legislative Council voted the fortification money, it did not discuss 
the question of principle involved in manning the forts. In January, r857, however, 
the desire for economy, the more stringent financial circumstances of a colony which 
seemed more tranquil, can be seen in the debates93 of the Legislative Assembly over a 
motion which stated that the two Imperial companies stationed in the Colony at 
colonial expense were unnecessary and should be dispensed with after r857. Though 
the motion was lost, the discussion cannot have seemed reassuring for the manning 
of the fortifications. At any rate, the incident probably made Denison conscious 
of the changes which would occur in the Colony's willingness to pay for troops. 
Apart from such methods as addresses and petitions, the Legislature's only 
regular means of influencing the number of troops was through its willingness to pay 
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extra troops above the minimum paid for by the Imperial Government, and through 
its attitude to providing colonial allowances for all the troops. 
The changes of mind of the Legislature both in Victoria and New South Wales 
created a problem in providing what the Imperial authorities regarded as adequate 
numbers if even a part of the troops paid for by the British Government received 
colonial allowances. The problem was basically that of harmonizing the decisions 
of the Imperial authority and the colonial legislature, the latter not beset with 
conflicting demands for troops, and expecting that it could change its mind at will. 
In the luxury of comparative isolation and when misgivings as to internal disorder 
had proved largely unfounded, the stirrings of local self-consciousness and feelings 
fairly typical in a colonial community emerging from dependence found some 
expression. In 1850, Mr. Donaldson had considered Britain should bear the expense, 
as New South Wales was a British dependency. Opposing Dr. Lang's views, William 
Charles Wentworth had said that the military force was the only link which attached 
them to the parent state, and with this link broken they would cease to be a British 
dependency. Wentworth94 had been protesting against a proposal to diminish 
Imperial responsibilities, but he had been thinking of" a body of gentlemen to supply 
their [the British soldiers'] place-a yeomanry or national guard ... " who would 
fight against the rapine and violence of lawless mobs. Three years later his view was 
still" if ... they were left to defend themselves at their own expense then ... the 
British Crown had no further hold on our allegiance ".95 Wentworth's earlier 
comment96 on one of Grey's military despatches, probably uttered in great heat, was 
also perceptive in the light of the subsequent course of events. The Herald reported 
him: "Let them get rid of British interference altogether and adopt those principles 
of responsible government, of which he for one, owned himself a supporter, and in 
hastening the approach of which he felt that there was one ingredient in the despatch." 
And thus the paradox that in the early fifties the fight for one aspect of self-government 
held up the attainment of another, some self-defence in the community, which did 
not move so quickly to assume financial and direct physical responsibility for defence. 
One member, Mr. Jones,97 in the debate on Cowper's motion that the services of two 
companies of the British Army stationed in the colony at the colonists' expense 
should be dispensed with, could refer to expenditure for the maintenance of a foreign 
military force. 
On the other hand, Mr. Parkes thought the colony should rely on its own resources, 
and even if this view was not always, in his own career, followed by executive action, 
it was an opinion which is often to be found in the community, for instance, in the 
Sydney Morning Herald, and it differed from complete reliance on Imperial measures. 
In July, 1858, Mr. Deas Thomson asked98 the Solicitor-General in the colonial 
Government of New South Wales, " considering the state of our relation with some 
of the most important foreign powers manifested by the news received from England, 
what steps had been taken for placing the recently erected forts on a footing of 
efficiency, as regards their armament ... and the means of working them effectively". 
Mr. Lutwyche, the member of the Colonial Government, replied with a frankness 
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which we have come to know in recent times, " that in all the steps which the colonial 
Government had undertaken in reference thereto, the proper defence of the Colony 
had always been carefully kept in view. Correspondence had taken place between 
the Colonial and Home governments, but this could not be spoken of as it had not 
been concluded, but it might not be perhaps too much to say that the question as to 
the advisability of raising a local force had not escaped the notice of the Government". 
The Herald very understandably concluded 99 that it was clear that the Ministry did not 
intend to make defensive preparations unless it heard of an actual declaration of war, 
when it would be too late to do so. In the event, the estimates for the two extra 
companies and for the Royal Artillery to be maintained by the colony were passed,loo 
and in December, 1858,101 the Assembly was invited to consider a larger military force. 
The second incident which may have helped to form Denison's views, the sending 
of troops to India, to which troops' income the Colony contributed at least allowances, 
raised this question of control. Denison had in 1858 ostensibly to withdraw under-
takings given to Canning in India. In view of some circumstances connected with a 
misunderstanding over the horses to be sent, Denison did not press the matter of the 
right of the General in Command to direct the removal of the artillery to India,l02 
but when he received a request for reinforcements from New Zealand in 1859, he 
informed the General what force he thought could be spared. He suggested that the 
military commander act at once, and when the Governor-General communicated 
to the Executive Council and to the Legislative the steps which were necessary, he 
did so " in terms which should not raise the question of the right or power of the 
General in Command to dispose of the military forces in the colonies to the best of 
his judgement and when any occasions of urgency might arise". 
DENISON'S SUGGESTIONS FOR SHARING THE DEFENCE COSTS 
Early, however, Denison became concernedl03 lest the view gained ground that 
England was indifferent to the state of the colonies. Leaving their defence entirely 
to them encouraged this impression. On the other hand, the insistence that the 
mother country assume the defence of the colonies was only valid on the assumption 
that the relation between the two was that of parent and child. This analogy, 
however, offered" no safe ground upon which to establish complicated systems of 
political instruction" .104 The obligation arose from the involvement of the colonies 
in the mother country's foreign policy and because of her Imperial commerce. 
His discussion of the nature of the threat showed that Imperial and colonial 
communities might both have interests in the colonial area, and there was an under-
lying belief in empire. A colonial military force would raise difficulties and problems, 
and in the absence of constant danger in Australia was not likely to be efficient.l05 
He, therefore, suggested that the Colony defray a proportion of the cost of the regular 
(Imperial) troops, and the proportion might be readily estimated as half the pay and 
allowances of the total force required. 
The Colony would then provide the accommodation and would erect and maintain 
all the fortifications which it might be deemed advisable to construct, while the 
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Imperial Government would organize troops, submit them to discipline and put them 
under its own military law. Troops must not be asked for under the fear of invasion 
and then sent away when the fear ended. On the other hand, if the Colony paid 
for the troops from England, and these troops were liable to be recalled either 
altogether or in full detachments, at the will of the military authorities in England, 
just grounds for complaint would be given to the Colony. 
The third incident which almost certainly contributed to Denison's thought is 
relevant here: the issue of the right of the Colony to control Imperial troops raised 
when a detachment was sent to New Zealand. In the case of the Artillery, which 
had been brought out to aid and protect the harbour at the express request of the 
colonial Government, which had paid for their transport, and had also borne the 
cost of their pay and allowances, the Legislature considered this force to be different 
from the infantry in New South Wales and to be to some extent under the control 
of the local Government. 
The Legislature did complain, and Denison felt in April, r860,106 that" further 
steps might be taken to vindicate the so-called right of the colonial Government to 
the entire control of this portion of Her Majesty's forces". It would be far better 
that the sum should be repaid to the Colony than that the "Government or the 
Legislature should be given an opening to claim the right of controlling the movement 
of the troops". It is important to notice that Denison was not furthering colonial 
control but seeking a system that would preserve Imperial goodwill and the freedom 
of administrative and strategic control to Great Britain. Denison was at first 
misunderstood107 on this point, and the integrity of the Imperial control was insisted 
upon at the Admiralty and the War Office108 (although Lord Herbert did not take it 
so seriously in regard to the Army as distinct from the N avy109) and also by witnesses 
such as Newcastle before the r86r Select Committee of the House of Commons.1l0 
Denison believed that the colonial Legislature should indicate the troops for which 
it would pay, and a decision as to the number was to be made by the Imperial 
authorities. The question of control was one of which Denison had become well 
aware, and his idea was that a clear antecedent admission of joint liability would 
remove colonial claims to control of any particular part of the force. 
The position of the Governor vis-a.-vis the colonial Legislature in respect of 
colonial troops is a controversial one in British Imperial constitutional history. The 
case of Sir George Grey in New Zealand was more a matter of the Governor vis-a.-vis 
the General commanding, but two other cases raising the extent of the Governor's 
authority over some force which the responsible colonial Government, at any rate 
partially, financed, occurred during the Governorships of Sir Bartle Frere and Sir 
Hercules Robinson in South Africa and New South Wales respectively. 
It seems that Denison's half-and-half division of expense between the Colony 
and the Imperial Government was drawn from ideas and proposals concerning steam 
and postal communication.llI In this case, and also that of the marine survey, the 
Australian group generally was to share half the cost with the United Kingdom. 
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THE CONVERSION OF DENISON'S SUGGESTION INTO A PLAK: 
THE ACTIVITY OF GODLEY IN THE 'vV AR OFFICE 
Denison regarded it as a good rough-and-ready measure, easy to administer, 
that the Colony and the United Kingdom should share equally the cost of Imperial 
troops. Though this scheme was developed to apply to the Australian colonies 
specifically, it became the Denison Plan in contradistinction to the Grey Plan. To 
Godley, and perhaps to Hamilton, it had the attraction of uniformity.ll2 
To Godley1l3 it was a " system" according to which colonies such as Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick would not receive special consideration because of small resources, 
and it was a means of changing the inertia and administrative inequities and the ways 
in which her colonies took advantage of Britain; of changing arrangements by which 
colonial allowances contributed by some colonial governments imposed on the British 
Government the expensive task of making up gross remuneration in other colonies. 
(In fact,1l4 in Australia, at least, the colonial granting of colonial allowances followed 
a suggestion emanating from the United Kingdom.) 
Arthur Koestler has written1l5 of the myth that can so quickly grow up around 
a man once he is dead, and we must beware of the tendency of biographers to 
exaggerate the role of the rarity of their subject. But Adderley, another Colonial 
Reformer, who regarded himself as Godley's closest friend, described116 him in a letter 
to another mutual friend as " one of the most leading minds and soundest judgements 
and most uncompromising consciences we may ever come in contact with ". Not all 
would agree with Adderley's comment on Godley's judgement, which in matters of 
colonial defence was based on his view of colonial self-reliance, which perhaps can be 
attributed partly to his High Church training and beliefs. Godley appears almost 
brusque and off-hand in his evidence before the 1861 Committee, until one remembers 
that he was declining in a painful illness and must have been making a supreme 
effort. 
In fact, his exertions in the circumstances of his health in the late eighteen 
fifties appear either to suggest very great strength of character or to emphasize 
the strength of a feeling he was known to have in regard to the adjustment of colonial 
relations, or perhaps to suggest both. 
According to Lord Robert Cecil,1l7 the feeling for self-reliance was apparent 
even in Godley's days in Canterbury. Earlier he had suggested to Gladstone the 
urgency of colonial reform, and he passed through New South \Vales in 1852 on his 
way back to England at a time when he saw it in the ferment of change and was 
impressed both with the vulgarity and the crudeness of its life and with its growing 
wealth. His reactionllS harmonized with his view that the fundamental error of the 
Whigs was the derivation of power from below, being in their concern with natural 
rights rather than with duties. 
In 1855, Godley was appointed to the Directorship of Ordnance and Stores in 
the War Department, making ample acquaintance with the confusion so significant in 
the Crimean War. He became Assistant Under-Secretary of State for \Var in 1857, 
and so remained until his death. Apparently he chafed under the Permanent Under-
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Secretary, Sir Benjamin Hawes, whose resistance to innovation was also arousing 
Florence Nightingale to fury. The separation of War from Colonies and the incom-
petence revealed in the War Department threw up the possibility of various reforms 
to Godley, some on quite a large scale. 
Godley's letters to Adderley119 show his concern at the quality of the political 
direction of England, and in military matters he was disgusted at the recruitment of 
the German Legion for South Africa and the brushing aside of a Canadian offer 
for an expeditionary force for the Crimea. It fell to him to inspect the German Legion 
in quarters at Portsmouth, and his conviction that hiring mercenaries was not the way 
to mend a shortage of good troops or to breed self-reliance or healthy colonial relation-
ships was reinforced by his having seen them. Later, in r860, Godley came to regard 
New Zealand as a test case for the self-reliant policy, viewing with contempt the 
colonial reaction to the onset of native troubles. "Their only notion on the approach 
of danger was to shriek for troops and abuse the Imperial Government."120 He was 
not opposed to colonies or to the maintenance of empire, rather he wrote of the 
" nationalization" of the British colonies. l2l 
As the Lyttleton Tablet at Harrow put it,122 " aequalium mentes ad majorum 
prrecepta quibus Colonisae non tam regendae sunt quam creandae inter primis 
revocavit ". 
Gairdner, Elliot and Merivale in the Colonial Office were all interested in this 
question, as their annotations on incoming despatches show. Barkly in Victoria, 
Young in Tasmania and MacDonnell in South Australia were also bringing up the 
business which raised the whole question of the principles of the apportionment of 
responsibility for colonial defence, but as laymen, and not always with the same wide 
scope and compass as that which was in Denison's despatches.l23 
Some particular questions in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties were the status 
of Her Majesty's Colonial Vessel Victoria,124 the payment of the transport of the 40th 
Regiment to Victoria, as well as the payment of the cost of the Headquarters' staff 
in Australia. These questions were being raised in despatches which reached an 
England whose Government was trying to economize in spite of the troubled European 
circumstances and of an expanding empire. The desire for economy was not confined 
to the Manchester School. Disraeli, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Derby's 
second Cabinet, was trying hard but unsuccessfully to carry out Gladstone's proposals 
to abolish the income tax by r860. One avenue was to prune the army estimates.125 
THE RESULT OF THE ApPOINTMENT OF THE r859 INTER-DEPARTMENTAL 
COMMITTEE 
It was, therefore, not surprising that Carnarvon, writing for Lytton, should have 
indicated126 to Denison in May, r859, the intention of the Government to appoint an 
inter-departmental committee to consider the whole question of colonial military 
expenditure. The Committee's appointment was thus foreshadowed a month before 
Herbert, Newcastle and Gladstone succeeded Peel, Lytton and Disraeli at the War, 
Colonies and Exchequer portfolios in Palm~rston's second Cabinet, and even then 
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rather belatedly because, in fact, General Peel, at the War Office in Derby's second 
Cabinet, had in March formally initiated the appointment of the Committee, which 
started its work quickly. Hawes in his letter referred to the" absence of any firm and 
general principle for the guidance of the Secretary of State in determining the numerous 
questions of military expenditure which continually arise in most of the colonies" .127 
The principle within which the Committee was to deliberate was that the mother 
country was to assist in the defence against aggression on the part of foreign civilized 
nations and (in a less proportion) formidable native tribes; but except in the case 
of pure garrison posts, she was not to assume the whole cost. The Colony was to 
contribute its own force or money to the Imperial force. Its internal defence was 
to be a local responsibility. 
The Committee consisted of Hamilton, Elliot and Godley. It found itself 
divided. Godley was jubilanF28 in winning over Hamilton to his views, but the 
Colonial Office representative wrote a minority Report to which Godley wrote a 
rejoinder. Herbert and Gladstone strongly approved Godley's report, though 
Herbert was prepared for slower results than was Gladstone.129 According to 
Carrington,130 there was a division in Cabinet, Gladstone arguing for the adoption of 
this report for reasons of economy, Palmerston more typically concerned with defence. 
This can be seen as one facet of the differences in this Cabinet. Gladstone would 
have favoured the move because of his belief in self-reliance and its moral importance 
for a self-governing community, apart altogether from his desire as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer to economize. 
THE CONTINUING INTEREST AND THE SELECT COMMITTEE 
After a strong hint by Godley, whose close friend he was, Adderley secured13l 
the publication of this report. The grateful Godley had to caution him against being 
the only enthusiast in Parliament, and he was indeed fortunate in having Adderley's 
energetic interest.132 Godley wrote133 to Adderley that he regretted he could not, 
because his official position made it impossible, write to The Times. Now and again 
he had some scruples about commenting indirectly to Cabinet Ministers other than 
his own Minister. Newcastle and Gladstone were his friends; "it is ", he wrote,134 
" hardly fair to Sidney Herbert that one of his subordinates should be perpetually 
bullying and harassing one of his colleagues". 
In 1859, Adderley indicated that he would move for a Select Committee of the 
Commons, and Herbert then announced to the Commons the existence of the Depart-
mental Committee, in fact already known to Adderley.135 In March, 1860, Adderley 
again advocated that a Select Committee be appointed, and remarked136 that the 
Departmental Committee had been made a pretext for stopping his committee of 
inquiry. Even the publication, as a result of his nagging, of the Departmental 
Committee's Report only provided him with an occasion for speaking.l37 Cecil, 
thinking that Godley and Hamilton had exceeded their terms of reference, and that a 
departmental report which was not unanimous was not a substitute for an announce-
ment of Government policy, considered that the appointment of a Select Committee 
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would best resolve the question, and Arthur Mills agreed with him. In June, 1860, 
Herbert announced that the Government would deal with the subject of colonial 
military expenditure without referring it to a Committee,13S but in March, 1861, 
Arthur Mills, a Colonial Reformer, secured its appointmentl39; the Prime Minister, 
Palmerston, who, thoughtl40 Godley, was" most reactionary in all his notions on this 
question", was sceptical of its value but did not oppose it.141 Adderley sat most 
actively-if the expression is permissible. It is said that the Committee was carefully 
picked by the Colonial Reformers and that Godley himself was consulted as to the 
choice of a chairman.142 He certainly helped Adderley to plan his campaign, though 
the members of the Committee were not all of the same mind---for example, Fergusson, 
Fortescue and Childers.1 43 
Probably the demands for reinforcement in New Zealand had added force to the 
need to resolve this question and to appoint a Committee. Certainly Adderley and 
Godley had been in touch with what was happening in New Zealand, and although 
in 1858144 the Colonial Office had indicated its adherence to the Grey system, the 
despatch of 26th July, 1860, signed by Sir George Cornwall Lewis,l45 firmly indicated, 
in reply to an appeal for aid from New Zealand, that the intention of the British 
Government was not to extend its commitments indefinitely nor to undertake unaided 
the major responsibility for conducting the war. 
The Australian group did not emerge badly in any comparison of the gross 
colonial contribution to local defence. Leaving aside the qualifications to any ready 
acceptance of the close accuracy of the returns, the colonies contributed about one-
tenth of nearly £4,000,000 spent on the military defence of colonies, and New South 
Wales and Victoria and Ceylon contributed a third of this colonial contribution.u6 
Tasmania and Western Australia were in a special category because of the recent 
convict past of the one and the presence of convicts in the other. Even Godley 
agreed147 that the Australian colonies had paid more than their fair share. The 
Australasian group, including New Zealand, was one of the foci of attention. But if 
New Zealand is excluded, the scale of its group's own contribution was not a direct 
grievance,us nor was the size of the garrison very significant in the total Imperial 
force, though in a time when expansion tugged at economy every battalion in the 
colonies could be the subject for review. 
THE GENERAL ARGUMENT OF THE Two COMMITTEES AND THE MILLS 
RESOLUTION 
The existing arrangements, the majority Report and the Select Committee 
argued, dispersed troops, failed to encourage self-reliance, and led to unequal and 
inadequate colonial contribution. Military expense at the Cape resulted in a drain 
which was not counterbalanced by benefits such as the provision of a market, or a 
field for emigration. The majority Report stated that disputes arose with bitterness 
about liabilities, as in the case of the transport of Victorian troops, " ... There 
being no recognized principles of mutual relations to which appeal can be made or 
upon which a permanent settlement can be founded. While, therefore, it seems 
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right that the colonies should as a rule decide on the content and nature of their own 
defences and have generally the management of them, it is unjust to throw the whole 
burden of the expense on the less interested party." The presence of scattered 
Imperial garrisons was undesirable, and the right system would be one based on local 
effort and local resources. "The maintenance of dominion over scattered and 
distant territories depends on the nature of the country and the populations or upon 
the command of the seas." 
Godley objected to the scattering of British troops, but it was for the colonists 
to settle if British troops were to be wholly withdrawn. In general, the Imperial 
Government's contribution, as Godley's views developed, was to take the shape of 
money only, and in his remarks on Mr. Elliot's memorandum he stated that the 
burden of the majority Report was that the whole system of defence, including the 
amount of the force, would be decided in the Colony. He seems to suggest local 
control and local forces, and yet, on the other hand, on one occasion at least, he had 
doubted149 if one could be colonist and soldier at the same time; he would not150 
express an opinion when asked if it would be better for the colonists to arm and train 
their own men. He probably did not face up fully to the implications of local control 
or perhaps it was to be local control of local troops, not of Imperial troops, for in the 
majority Report the Imperial troops sent to the colonies would be at the Imperial 
Government's disposal should any emergency require them to be withdrawn. Godley 
and Hamilton believed that the adoption of their plan would reduce the colonial 
demands for garrisons. Perhaps Godley was interested not in the total economy of 
the forces of the Empire, but in the economy of the United Kingdom's forces. 
Godley and Hamilton did not approve the Grey arrangement, because they 
regarded the basis on which it rested, the garrison system, as unsound. The Denison 
Plan, if there were to be Imperial troops stationed in the Colony, could be open to 
this objection, though from a financial aspect, as distinct from the drain in manpower, 
the mother country might not be incurring so much liability. 
The Grey Plan, wrote Hamilton and Godley, was not flexible and required 
negotiation with changing circumstances. Here again, the new plan, too, would 
require negotiation as to the total of troops unless the Colony was prepared to accept 
the Imperial Government's figures without demur, or unless, if the Colony were to 
take the initiative, the Imperial Government would accept its arrangements and 
perhaps commit itself to the allocation of military force. 
The argument of joint interest was denied by Godley and Hamilton; the 
obligation of the mother country arose as a matter of honour and duty from British 
control of foreign policy. Even a small garrison in a colony was taken as a symbol 
of British responsibility and could discourage self-reliance. The majority Report 
divided the colonies into two groups: one group included "military posts ... in 
which for objects altogether independent of and distinct from the defence of particular 
countries in which they are situated the Imperial Government thinks it necessary to 
maintain garrisons ", for instance, Malta and Gibraltar. The second class comprised 
all the rest of the colonies: "all those where troops are stationed primarily, if not 
32 DEFENCE IN THE EIGHTEEN FIFTIES IN N.S.W. 
exclusively, for the defence of the lives, liberties and property of their inhabitants". 
The Denison Plan was to be adopted in these. The mother country was to specify 
the maximum amount beyond which she would not contribute without further 
agreement. This classification rejected an argument of joint interest, and the 
consideration of factors, such as a colony'S capacity to pay and the amount of its 
resources, was thus irrelevant to Godley. 
When the Select Committee of r86r adopted a very similar classification, Sir 
George Cornwall Lewis commented,151 " it is not expressed with much clearness or 
precision ... we apprehend that the dependencies of the second as well as the first 
class are maintained chiefly for objects of Imperial policy. If this were not assumed 
to be the case, they would probably not be maintained at all." 
If the colony was really to decide the size of forces as well as the system of defence, 
Godley's assumption that the Imperial military expenditure would be reduced rested 
on the correctness of his hope that the colonies would be encouraged to prune their 
prOVIsIOns. His view of scattered garrisons and fortifications-which had much 
support from lay and service thinking-perhaps made this seem less regrettable 
from a strategic point of view, and his conclusion seemed by Australian and Canadian 
experience to be given some weight. 
Godley pointed out that, theoretically, if the Imperial Government determined 
its allocation under the Grey measure with reference to Imperial interests, the Colony 
might still leave colonial interests unprovided for. This should not have caused 
him concern if he believed that colonial interests were not necessarily Imperial 
interests, and if he believed Imperial economy would lead to colonial self-reliance. 
Godley's assumption was apparently that half the cost of troops and fortifications 
was still less than the Imperial" quota" together with incidental expenses. 
Of course, Godley apparently believed that relations with the natives were 
primarily a matter for the colonists, who should have to bear a larger share in the 
military conduct of, and payment for, wars which might be a result of their actions 
and policies.152 If this were so, one would imagine that the Grey scheme would have 
provided the basis for an Imperial case for economizing; as a matter of politics, 
however, it may have been easier to concentrate the attack on the military methods 
and arrangements. 
The Colonial Office representative (and the Ministerial view in the Commons 
was very similar) differed from the other members of the Inter-departmental 
Committee, both in his conception of the colonial relationship and of Britain's interests 
in colonies, and also on the plan by which the British Government was to allot troops. 
Elliot regarded Britain and the colonies as having joint interests, and this appears 
in his criticism of Godley's opinion that a uniform arrangement should be applied. 
He criticizes Godley's view that poor nations are like poor individuals (assuming 
they are obliged to contribute equally with Britain) " ... they are not nations but 
members of one immensely powerful nation". Britain's interests included the supply 
of raw materials and native policy. "I freely admit that poorer communities will 
have inferior roads and landing places, schools, gaols, houses and hospitals. The 
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deficiency is not to be supplied from the Imperial purse; but if in these islands the 
very existence of society depends on having a small military force, may not the 
provision of it be fairly deemed the duty of the sovereign power?" This remark 
caused Godley to regard Elliot as favouring the "eleemosynary principle". To 
Godley, varying resources or exposure to danger were not reasons for not imposing 
a common rule. 
To Elliot the presence of Imperial troops was important as a symbol of the 
strength of the British Empire, which could be mobilized for the defence of the colony, 
and he considered the colonies differed so much that no uniform system was possible. 
To Elliot, Godley's second group was too heterogeneous for a uniform rule, 
including, for instance, as well as Canada and Australia, South Africa and New 
Zealand which, with their problems and relations with natives, required different 
arrangements from those which pertained in North America and Australia, and in 
most of the colonies in the latter two groups the Grey system was being applied. 
Elliot did not regard it as possible to establish" any self-acting rule which shall be 
a substitute for the judgement and firmness of the Minister for the Crown for the 
time being. To deal with cases on their merits appear to me the tasks and duties 
inseparable from the function of governing colonies which can never be superseded by 
the machinery of a system however ably conceived and logically constructed." 
This sensible attitude suggests that one should realize the limitations on applying 
even the Grey system, and when we have spoken of its application in the eighteen 
fifties it has been in this qualified sense. 
It does seem that Godley was using the Denison Plan as a formula with which 
to disturb the status quo. This is perhaps supported by his letters to Adderley, 
by the opening remarks of his rejoinder to Elliot, and it is the view reached after 
considering the evidence and report of the 1861 Committee. It is also Sir George 
Cornwall Lewis's impression. The Colonial Office argument153 was that insofar 
as the system could be applied, it was already operating to a considerable extent, and 
Elliot's view was the realistic one for one who believed in empire, that the military 
expense problem could not be solved as a separate problem, it was a matter of " native 
policy" and other questions. Carrington's judgement154-" The Colonial Office, 
true to precedent, obstructed any innovation" -seems ill-expressed, particularly 
when a few pages later there is a reference to Earl Grey's work almost a decade before 
that of Godley. 
The Report of the Select Committee recognized that the colonies had a claim 
arising from the consequences of Imperial policy. It did not consider a uniform rule 
applicable, but considered that the colonies in the second group should bear the main 
cost of their military defence, and urged that Australia and New Zealand, South 
African, Ceylon and the West Indies were fit subjects for reduction of expenditure 
or personnel. The British Government was to have regard to local resources, to the 
colonies' danger from external attack, and to the general exigencies of the Empire. 
Apparently in the interests of reducing expenditure, negotiations would be avoided, 
and Grey's example followed. In regard to New Zealand, the Committee's general 
c 
34 DEFENCE IN THE EIGHTEEN FIFTIES IN N.S.W. 
recommendation was slightly qualified by its awareness of the Maori problem, and 
while Britain formally controlled native policy, in South Africa and similar com-
munities local efforts and local organizations were to provide security against warlike 
tribes and domestic disturbance as far as possible. 
The Report was made on the assumption that expensive colonial military 
expenditure was undesirable. Mills, the Chairman of the Select Committee, denied 
that he was in favour of the dismemberment of colonies.155 He said the inquiry 
assumed that Britain was to maintain her empire, develop colonial resources and 
qualify them for present self-government and eventual independence. The very 
formulation of "colonial military expenditure" rather than "Imperial military 
expenditure on colonies" is, however, indicative. The Committee did not consider 
much technical military evidence. It assumed apparently that naval defence was 
an Imperial matter, and that it was available, and was independent of colonial 
fortifications. 
The House of Commons, debating the Select Committee's Report, passed a 
resolution moved by its Chairman,156 recognizing colonial claims to Imperial aid 
which arose as a consequence of Imperial foreign policy and expressing the opinion 
that colonies exercising the right to self-government ought to undertake the main 
responsibilities of providing for their own internal security. The resolution was not 
very startling and rather general. 
But if the Select Committee's Report and the resolution did not embody the 
Denison-Godley scheme in detail, they certainly reflected the spirit of Godley, but 
not that of Denison, and the inquiries of 1859-1862, combined no doubt with the 
events of those years, at least made interest in the question more vocal, and probably 
increased this interest. The Mills resolution providedI57 parliamentary support 
for, and the discussion favourably stimulated public approval of, the efforts of the 
executive Government to reduce expense, and this was the policy pursued in the 
'sixties, and it led to the withdrawal of British garrisons. The colonial response 
in New South Wales to the sentiments of the Reports and the motion was mixed. 
Irritation at the opinions of colonies and the colonial relationship which had been 
expressed was accompanied by a realization that the growing community must accept 
responsibility.1 58 As Sir George Cornwall Lewis pointed out, the movement for 
reduction was not a colonial one, although the growth of some colonial communities 
in wealth and status and the occasional disputes over control and financial responsi-
bility were the basis of administrators' interest in this matter as one of policy. 
The proposal of Cardwell,159 who appeared in this matter both while at War 
and at Colonies, for a colonial contribution for each Imperial soldier in the 'sixties 
in New South Wales, the form which the reduction policy took, in some respects 
resembled Denison's Plan rather than Grey's, and the problems of H.M.C.V. Victoria 
and the passing at Westminster of the Colonial Naval Service Act of 1865, as well 
as the legislation in some of the colonies, indicated the increasing, though only 
gradually successful, tendency to rely on colonial participation in kind and control 
as well as in money and defence, as did the new Volunteer Movement in New South 
Wales. 
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THE ROLE OF DENISON'S SUGGESTIONS AS A CATALYTIC AGENT 
Perhaps the years 1859 to 1862 rather than 1870, the date of the last withdrawal 
of Imperial garrisons in Australia, are the significant dates, if significant dates have to 
be sought. And the bias of our starting point-New South Wales in the eighteen 
fifties-must not cause us to exaggerate Denison's influence, yet both his plan and the 
raising of the question persistently just at this time attracted attention in England. 
Of course, there were the long-run factors and influences, but the formulation of 
policy, the decision-making process, implies, at least very often, the attempt to 
recognize and give expression to these influences, to see that problems exist and must 
be resolved. 
Almost always, a number of people contribute, and their appreciations of the 
problems are within the framework of different assumptions and even beliefs. 
Denison and Godley were such protagonists, and the Protectionist Movement in 
Canada was one such factor, the lesson of which was generalized. Stacey has 
written180 : "the Canadian tariff of 1859 was in fact a large nail in the coffin of 
the garrison system, but it was to be ten years and more before the lid was screwed 
down above the corpse." His metaphor is difficult to apply to the whole problem, 
as most are, without distorting the historical facts. The garrison system died partly 
through the efforts of Grey and Denison, both somewhat insensitive to colonial feeling, 
but Denison realizing more deeply the implications of the growth of the colonial 
community, whose existence they both valued. But the development of colonial 
military activity in an Empire bigger, but with looser bonds, provided ultimately 
for substantial Imperial co-operation. 
William Denison, Lieutenant-General, Knight-Commander of the Bath, Captain-
General and Governor-in-Chief in and over our Territory called New South Wales, 
Governor-General in and over all our Colonies of New South Wales, Van Diemen's 
Land, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia, brother of the Bishop of 
Salisbury and of the Speaker of the House of Commons, would probably have been 
affronted if his function was seen as that of an undertaker, yet his plan was probably 
the most useful nail for Godley's hammer. Certainly his enterprise-so different 
an undertaking-did nothing in spite of the strong Imperial sentiment of its author 
to slow up the screwing down. 
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